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In this paper, we perform a Tobit analysis of aid allocations, covering the period 1999-2002 
and accounting for both altruistic and selfish donor motives. We first compare the allocative 
behavior of all bilateral donors taken together with that of multilateral aid agencies, and then 
look at nine major bilateral donors individually. It turns out that poorer countries get clearly 
more aid from both bilateral and multilateral donors, with the possible exception of France 
and Japan. Most bilateral donors and the multilateral agencies are also found to direct 
significantly more aid to well governed recipients if governance is measured by the World 
Bank’s CPIA. If the CPIA is replaced by the Kaufmann index, however, the policy orientation 
of aid becomes extremely weak. In contrast to a recent paper by Dollar and Levin (2004), our 
estimates do neither suggest that multilateral aid is more poverty and policy oriented than 
bilateral aid, nor that IDA performs particularly well within the group of multilateral donors. 
Post-conflict resolution, the third altruistic motive considered in the paper, emerges as a 
significant determinant of aid allocations in 2002. The importance of selfish aid motives 
clearly differs between bilateral and multilateral donors. We find no evidence that donor 
countries were able to push through their individual trade and political interests at the 
multilateral level. By contrast, the export-related self interest of DAC countries provided a 
fairly strong incentive to grant bilateral aid, as did colonial ties.  
JEL classification : C24 ; F35 
Keywords : Foreign Aid Allocations; Donor Motives; Tobit Analysis 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The fight against absolute poverty and widening income disparities between the poorest and 
the richest countries figures prominently in both the academic and political debate. Recent 
reports, notably UNDP (2005), argue that a substantial increase of official development aid 
would help considerably in making progress in this regard. At the same time, the effectiveness 
of aid could be improved by an appropriate targeting of aid. This raises the question of 
whether donors have increasingly directed aid to needy and deserving recipients, i.e., 
developing countries that are particularly poor and have reasonable local conditions in place 
for aid having the desired effect of reducing poverty and stimulating income growth. 
Dollar and Levin (2004) have made a strong point that the allocation of aid has recently 
become much more efficient as donors increasingly adhere to the principle of selectivity. The 
short review of the literature in Section II points to several unsettled questions, however. Most 
importantly, the allocation of aid can only be assessed appropriately if both developmental 
concerns and selfish donor motivations are taken into account. 
Therefore, we perform a regression analysis that includes altruistic and selfish determinants of 
aid, employing a Tobit model, presented in Section III, to account for the censored nature of 
the aid variable. We compare the allocative behavior of all bilateral donors with that of 
multilateral donors to evaluate the widespread view that the latter are superior donors due to a 
stronger orientation to poverty concerns and local conditions for aid being effective. In 
addition, we assess nine major bilateral donors individually to account for differences with 
regard to the relative importance of selfish and altruistic motivations of aid. The empirical 
results are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes and proposes some avenues for 
future research. 
II. WHERE DO WE STAND? 
Industrialized countries may grant aid to developing countries for a variety of reasons. On the 
one hand, donors may be concerned about humanitarian needs in recipient countries and, thus, 
help foster the recipients’ economic development. On the other hand, donors may pursue 
selfish motivations. Aid may be used to support the donor’s  economy, notably through 
promoting exports of the donor country to the recipient country. Furthermore, the allocation   2
of aid may be shaped by former colonial ties and current strategic and political interests of 
donors. 
According to earlier empirical studies, selfish motivations of donors have traditionally played 
an important role in the allocation of aid. Schraeder et al. (1998: 319) “clearly reject the 
rhetorical statements of policymakers within the industrialized North who publicly assert that 
foreign aid is an altruistic tool of foreign policy.” Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that 
bilateral aid was dictated as much by political and strategic considerations as by the economic 
needs and policy performance of the recipients. Collier and Dollar (2002) concluded that the 
actual allocation of aid was radically different from the poverty-efficient allocation. Alesina 
and Weder (2002) rejected the rhetoric of donors that aid rewarded efficient and honest 
governments. McGillivray (2003: 7) summarized the evidence available from earlier studies 
as follows: “Developmental or humanitarian concerns, including the reduction of poverty, 
receive a relatively low or even zero weight.” 
However, these findings may no longer apply. Bilateral and multilateral donors claim to have 
adjusted their aid allocation in order to take recent academic insights into account. Influential 
contributions to the debate on foreign aid have shown that its effectiveness could be greatly 
improved if aid was directed primarily to poor countries pursuing development-friendly 
economic policies (World Bank 1998; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Dollar 2001). 
Isenman and Ehrenpreis (2003) as well as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that aid could 
also be effective under conditions of post-conflict reconstruction. Such insights are underlying 
the so-called Millennium Challenge Account of the United States, according to which good 
governance and market-friendly economic policies are required for developing countries to 
receive US aid (Clemens and Radelet 2003). OECD representatives reckon: “After the cold 
war, donors have given more emphasis to development criteria than previously, including 
selectivity according to both poverty needs and policy performance” (Isenman and Ehrenpreis 
2003: 10). McGillivray (2003) refers to a recent survey of ten donors to make the point that 
developmental criteria have received higher priority in aid allocation. Multilateral institutions, 
in particular, are said to have a clearer developmental focus. The World Bank (2002: 69) 
contends that the allocation of its aid “has improved dramatically in recent years.” 
Nevertheless, there is reason to be sceptical whether fine words have been translated into 
noble deeds. Langhammer (2004) considers it naïve that aid granted for strategic reasons has 
become an issue of the past, especially after September 11, 2001. The descriptive statistics 
and bivariate correlations presented by Nunnenkamp et al. (2004) do not support the view that   3
the targeting of aid has improved significantly. Most donors did provide more aid to relatively 
poor countries, but so far the fight against poverty does not appear to have resulted in a 
stronger focus on recipient countries with particularly high incidence of absolute poverty. 
According to Nunnenkamp et al. (2004), many donors also failed to direct aid predominantly 
to where local conditions were conducive to a productive use of inflows. The response of 
donors to changing institutional and policy conditions in recipient countries is shown to be 
fairly weak. 
Some recent studies, applying multivariate econometric techniques to account for various 
determinants of aid, portray a more favorable picture on the allocation of aid: 
•  Neumayer (2005) analyses the allocation of food aid by the three most important 
donors and non-governmental organizations in the 1990s. He shows that neither export 
and military-strategic interests of donors nor former colonial ties with recipients had 
an impact on food aid. As noted by the author, his findings differ strikingly from 
previous results relating to overall aid. This contrast may be because food aid is 
peculiar in that it is more oriented to recipient need than other forms of foreign aid.1 
•  Based on an extremely rich dataset, Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) perform a three-
dimensional panel analysis covering 22 donors and 137 recipients over the period 
1980-1999. Major findings are: (i) Aid commitments per capita of the recipients’ 
population were higher for recipients at a lower income level, which proxies for the 
need for aid. (ii) Most donors rewarded good economic policy outcomes in the 1990s 
and paid great attention to good governance in recipient countries. (iii) The end of the 
cold war has reduced the bias of aid towards former colonies, whereas donors have 
increasingly favored trade partners. Using the same dataset, Berthélemy (2005) 
stresses that aid allocation differs considerably across bilateral donors. Switzerland, 
Ireland, Denmark and Norway turn out to be most altruistic, whereas the United 
Kingdom, Italy, France and Australia are considered “selfish” donors. 
•  Dollar and Levin (2004) estimate a regression equation across aid recipients for each 
of some 40 bilateral and multilateral donors, on the basis of which they construct a 
poverty selectivity index as well as a policy selectivity index. These authors use gross 
disbursements of aid, net of emergency aid, as the dependent variable. The main 
                                                 
1   Note that food aid accounted for just about 3 per cent of overall aid in 1998.   4
finding is that the same group of donors that are very poverty focused are also very 
policy focused. This group includes the International Development Association (IDA), 
Denmark, the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands. Policy selectivity is 
shown to have increased significantly between the periods 1984-1989 and 1995-1999. 
However, “overall bilateral aid is not very selective” (Dollar and Levin 2004: 14) as 
some quantitatively important donors, notably France and the United States, are 
neither poverty focused nor policy focused. 
The studies by Berthélemy and Tichit as well as Dollar and Levin provide important 
benchmarks against which to compare the approach and findings of this paper. This is also 
because these studies give rise to a number of questions and suffer from several shortcomings 
which we would like to address. As concerns the dependent variable, Dollar and Levin net out 
emergency relief on the plausible premise that this type of aid would not necessarily adhere to 
selectivity concerns. However, the approach taken by these authors cannot account for 
negative net disbursements of aid and treats the large number of zero observations arbitrarily. 
As noted by Roodman (2004), the log-linear regression model ignores that the distribution of 
aid disbursements is truncated and thus may lead to biased estimates.  
The analysis of Dollar and Levin is also flawed in that it does not consider variables that may 
capture the self interest of donors. For example, the favorable assessment of the United 
Kingdom as a strongly poverty and policy focused donor is in striking contrast to Berthélemy 
and Tichit, who classify the United Kingdom as “selfish”. This difference may be due to the 
neglect of bilateral trade relations and colonial heritage as independent variables by Dollar 
and Levin. 
Berthélemy and Tichit do account for the truncated nature of the dependent aid variable as 
well as for the trade interests of donors. It remains open to question, however, why the authors 
apply the ratio of the donor’s exports plus imports to GDP. It would be more appropriate to 
consider only the donor’s exports since export promotion seems to be the motive underlying 
tied aid. More importantly, the policy outcome variables used by Berthélemy and Tichit to 
reveal the policy orientation of aid allocation are highly problematic.2 Annual GDP growth of 
the recipient country reflects not only the local policy framework, but may also be shaped by 
                                                 
2  The same applies to Berthélemy (2005), who uses essentially the same variables to assess the 
quality of the policy framework in recipient countries.   5
external factors beyond the control of policymakers. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the 
simultaneity problem, resulting from possible growth effects of aid, can be overcome by a 
one-period lag. Other variables such as infant mortality and primary school enrolment capture 
the recipients' need for aid, rather than the quality of local policies.3 Similarly, the 
attractiveness of recipient countries to foreign direct investment is more likely to reveal that a 
country is relatively advanced and, thus, less dependent on aid.4 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) as well as Berthélemy (2005) state that they tried policy 
variables considered by Burnside and Dollar (2000) to indicate under which conditions aid is 
likely to be effective in stimulating growth. It is mainly because these variables, including the 
rate of inflation, government budget deficits and openness to trade, turned out to be 
insignificant in shaping the allocative behavior of donors why Berthélemy and Tichit turn to 
the aforementioned “outcome variables”. This procedure implies that the insignificance of 
policy variables does not offer any relevant insights. Actually, however, the insignificant 
results may be a strong indication that aid donors were less policy oriented than suggested by 
the authors. The regression analysis to which we now turn attempts to solve this puzzle by 
applying different measures of the institutional and policy environment prevailing in aid 
recipient countries. 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
1. Definition of Variables 
We choose total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements as compiled by 
the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to be our dependent variable, and  
follow Dollar and Levin (2004) in netting out emergency relief.5 The main advantage of 
looking at disbursements rather than commitments is that they more accurately reflect the 
                                                 
3  See Kanbur (2004), who argues that, in order to assess policy outcomes, the change in variables 
such as infant mortality and literacy, rather than their level, should be considered. 
4   Foreign direct investment in developing countries tends to be concentrated in relatively advanced 
countries. 
5   The only exception is IDA, for which DAC does not report emergency relief. See annex for 
definition and sources of variables.   6
resource transfers actually taking place.6 Those who prefer to work with commitments tend to 
argue that commitments constitute the only variable over which donors exert full control if for 
some reason recipients lack the willingness or administrative capacity to request committed 
resources. The existing controversy notwithstanding, estimations are unlikely to be affected 
much by the choice of either commitments or disbursements as the two are highly correlated 
(Neumayer 2003). Opting for total aid instead of aid per capita appears to be justified as 
donors are more likely to allocate a fixed overall amount of money on a country basis than on 
a per capita basis (McGillivray and Oczkowski 1992). 
With regard to the set of explanatory variables to be considered, we assume in accordance 
with most of the recent literature (e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; 
Neumayer 2003) that donors are neither entirely selfish nor entirely altruistic. Hence, we 
account for both donor interest and recipient need. Bilateral exports of donors to recipients, 
expressed as a percentage of total donor exports, serve as a proxy of donors’ commercial self-
interest. When aid is tied, a simultaneity bias might arise as more tied aid will lead to more  
imports from the respective donor. This problem is mitigated by taking values of the trade 
variable that are lagged one year. To examine further whether large shareholders might be 
able to push through their trade interests in multilateral aid institutions, we also construct a 
specific trade variable for the multilateral regressions that is defined as the sum of exports 
from the nine most important bilateral donors to each recipient, divided by total exports of the 
nine donors.   
Donors’ political and strategic interest is represented here by colonial dummies that enter the 
bilateral aid regressions for France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, plus a dummy 
that reflects the special relationships of the United States with Egypt and Israel.7 Analogous 
to the case of trade, we allow for the possibility that colonial powers influence multilateral aid 
allocations in favor of their former colonies, by specifying a colonial dummy that is set equal 
to one for all recipients that were former colonies of Belgium, France, the Netherlands or the 
United Kingdom. 
                                                 
6   In principle, the so-called Effective Development Assistance (Chang et al. 1998) provides an even 
better measure of the resource flows than ODA. The EDA calculates the grant equivalent value of 
loans rather than counting them at face value as soon as the grant element exceeds 25 per cent. 
However, EDA data are only available at the aggregate bilateral and multilateral level und thus will 
not be used here. 
7   We would like to thank Jean-Claude Berthélemy for sharing with us his data on former colonies.   7
The findings of the aid effectiveness literature cited above suggest that poverty, good 
governance and post-conflict situations are key factors that donors may take into account if 
their objective is to foster recipient needs. The most straightforward indicator of humanitarian 
need is per-capita income, measured as GDP per capita in purchasing power parities, which is 
also adopted here. A direct measure of poverty might be more closely related to humanitarian 
need, but poverty indicators are much less readily available and not easily comparable across 
countries and over time, even though the World Bank has made great strides in this respect by 
devising the well-known one-Dollar-a-day poverty headcount. 
Among the various available governance indicators, we opt for the World Bank’s Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) , because this is the indicator that has figured 
most prominently in recent discussions about aid allocations, particularly in the World Bank 
itself, but arguably also in major donor countries such as the United States. The main 
drawback of this choice is that the World Bank does not provide comprehensive information 
on the CPIA.8 A full classification of more than 100 countries into five CPIA categories 
ranging from very good to very poor is only available for one year (Collier and Dollar 2001). 
For a comparison over the period 1999-2002, we have to rely on a grouping of IDA eligible 
countries by quintiles, with a “one” assigned to countries with least favorable policies and a 
“five” to those with most favorable policies. Given this limitation, we conduct a sensitivity 
analysis employing the so-called Kaufmann index, another comprehensive governance 
indicator (Kaufmann et al. 2003). Since the Kaufmann index is known to be highly correlated 
with GDP per capita, which may give rise to multicollinearity problems, we first regress GDP 
per capita on the index and then include the estimated residuals in the aid regressions.  
To investigate whether aid is higher than usual in case of post-conflict reconstruction needs, 
we construct a dummy variable that is set equal to one if according to the World Bank Post 
Conflict Fund (PCF) database a country received PCF grants in a particular year. 
Finally, in addition to the variables representing donor interest and recipient need, we also 
control for the population of the recipient country, expecting that in absolute terms aid 
                                                 
8  A more fundamental critique of the CPIA and, for that matter, of any policy-based indicator is 
provided by Kanbur (2004). He argues that country assessments should more strongly focus on 
outcome variables such as reductions in infant mortality, given that the link between policies and 
outcomes is far from obvious. However, Kanbur’s critique has to be interpreted as a normative 
statement regarding the future allocation of aid and barely touches on the question of past aid 
allocations raised here.     8
increases with country size, even though it may fall in per-capita terms and thus exhibit a 
small-country bias. 
2. Estimation Method 
The statistical analysis of aid allocation is affected by the truncated nature of the aid variable. 
This is particularly true for smaller donors such as Denmark or Norway, which tend to 
concentrate their aid on a few recipients. With many ‘zero’ observations, OLS estimates such 
as those presented by Dollar and Levin (2004) tend to be biased as they do not account for the 
non-linearity in the relationship that is estimated. Three different approaches to deal with this 
issue have been suggested in the literature (Neumayer 2003; Berthélemy and Tichit  2004). 
The first approach is a two-part model, where the first step involves a Probit estimation that 
determines the probability of receiving aid (selection equation), and the second step an OLS 
estimation that determines the amounts of aid for the sub-sample of positive aid observations 
(allocation equation). Formally, aid to recipient i is defined as: 
,








where F(.) denotes the cumulative distribution function, Y and Z are explanatory variables for 
the selection and allocation equation, a and b the respective vectors of coefficients, and u and 
v independent and normally distributed error terms. 
The crucial assumption underlying this approach is that the choice of the recipient and the 
amount of aid allocated are independent of each other (u and v are not correlated). If this 
assumption does not hold, which appears to be highly plausible, the regression in the second 
step suffers from a selection bias.  
The second approach is the sample selection or Heckman model, which resembles the two-
part model, except that u and v are not assumed to be independent. Again, a Probit estimation 
is performed in the first step. In the second step, the so-called inverse Mill’s ratio from the 
first step is added to the set of explanatory variables in order to correct for the selection bias. 
We then obtain: 
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where  ρ stands for cov(u,v), σ for var(v), and f(.)/F(.) for the inverse Mill’s ratio. 
The third approach is the Tobit model, which estimates aid allocations in one step, taking the 
truncated nature of the aid variable directly into account. Aid to a specific recipient is 
specified as the maximum of zero and a linear combination of the explanatory variables so as 
to guarantee that predicted aid flows cannot become negative: 
). 0 ), max( i i i v bZ aid + =   
The main difference compared to the Heckman model is that the variables are restricted to 
have an identical impact on aid eligibility and the amount of aid given so that the more 
general specification might be regarded as superior.9 The Heckman procedure, however, 
suffers from its own problems: if the same set of explanatory variables is employed in both 
equations, estimates risk to become unreliable due to severe multicollinearity problems. Since 
it is very difficult to find appropriate exclusion variables for the first step of the Heckman 
procedure, we follow Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) and adopt the Tobit model for our 
regression analysis. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The subsequent analysis proceeds in two major steps. First, we compare the allocative 
behavior of all bilateral donors taken together with that of multilateral aid agencies. In this 
way, it can be assessed whether the latter are more poverty and policy oriented than 
presumably more self-interested bilateral donors. Second, we run estimates for nine major 
bilateral donors individually. These are: Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This group accounted for 83 
per cent of total bilateral aid in 2002. The allocative behavior is expected to differ between 
these bilateral donors, e.g. with regard to the relative importance of selfish and altruistic 
motivations of aid. In both steps of our analysis, we focus on the most recent past. Depending 
on the availability of data, the starting point is 1998 or 1999. Hence, we cover the period in 
which aid should have become more poverty and policy oriented according to the public 
announcements made by several donors (see Section II). 
                                                 
9   Note that the Tobit model can be derived as a special case of the Heckman procedure with 
coefficients, variables and residuals that are the same in the selection and allocation equation.   10
1. Total Bilateral and Multilateral Aid 
In addition to comparing the behavior of all bilateral donors and all multilateral agencies, we 
present separate estimates for aid from IDA. This is not only because IDA represents the most 
important multilateral aid agency, accounting for about 30 per cent of total multilateral aid 
disbursements in 2003, but also because Dollar and Levin (2004) found IDA aid to be 
particularly well targeted to poor countries with favorable local conditions. 
As concerns the poverty orientation of aid, the estimates presented in Table 1 do not support 
the view that multilateral aid is superior to bilateral aid. If anything, there is weak evidence in 
favor of the opposite view. Taking the per-capita income of recipients as the usual proxy of 
recipient need, we find that poorer countries get clearly more aid from both bilateral and 
multilateral donors. Almost all coefficients of per-capita income are significantly negative at 
the 1 per cent level. With the size of the coefficients varying between –0.02 and –0.06, an 
increase in per-capita income by US$ 1000 would, on average, reduce aid disbursements by 
US$ 40 million. 
Likewise, there is little difference between bilateral and multilateral donors with regard to the 
two dummies included in our estimates. The colonial dummy remains insignificant without 
exception. This indicates that former colonial powers did not, or were not able to, influence 
the allocative behavior of all bilateral donors taken together or that of multilateral agencies. 
Post-conflict resolution did not result in higher multilateral aid throughout the period under 
consideration, while bilateral donors provided more aid to post-conflict countries only in 
2002. For this year, however, our results suggest that countries eligible for PCF grants 
received on average the impressive amount of US$ 132 million more in bilateral aid than 
those not eligible. 
Both bilateral and multilateral donors directed significantly more aid to well governed 
recipients if the CPIA is applied as a measure of the quality of local conditions. All 
coefficients of the CPIA variable are significantly positive at the 5 per cent level or better. 
The policy orientation of bilateral donors appears to have strengthened over time. In 2002, a 
country grading up from, say, “three” to “four” in the CPIA ranking would, on average, have 
raised aid inflows by US$ 75 million, compared to a mere US$ 40 million in 1999. 
Furthermore,  in contrast to Dollar and Levin (2004), we do not find the policy orientation of 
aid provided by IDA to be stronger than that of multilateral aid from other sources. This result   11
is striking as donors other than IDA could be expected to have more reservations to accept the 
World Bank’s CPIA as a guiding principle for allocating aid. 
In addition to these minor discrepancies between bilateral and multilateral aid, there are also 
some pronounced differences. In particular, the exports of donor countries to recipient 
countries did not affect the allocation of multilateral aid, whereas the export-related self 
interest of DAC countries provided a fairly strong incentive to grant bilateral aid. In 2001, for 
example, 50 per cent higher average donor exports were associated with more than US$ 30 
million additional aid disbursements, which suggests a considerably stronger impact of 
commercial interests on aid than that found by Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) for the 1990s. In 
other words, the aforementioned poverty and policy orientation must not be misunderstood to 
imply that selfish motivations of bilateral aid are no longer relevant. This supports the 
reasoning in Section II that Dollar and Levine (2004) missed important determinants of aid in 
their estimation approach.  
As expected, more populous recipients got more multilateral aid, but – strikingly – the 
coefficient for population turns out to be significantly negative in the case of bilateral aid. It 
has to be taken into account, however, that the inclusion of both donor exports and recipients’ 
population in the Tobit model may pose problems of multicollinearity. Hence, we performed 
additional estimates, not reported here, in which we entered either the export variable or the 
population variable. Population then becomes positively related to bilateral aid, too, though 
less significantly so than to multilateral aid. The weaker relationship between bilateral aid and 
country size is largely due to the behavior of two major donors, France and the United States. 
France, in particular, exhibits an extremely strong small-country bias, rendering the simple 
correlation between total aid and recipients’ population even slightly negative. 
Subsequently, we check the robustness of these findings to changes in the measurement of 
local conditions for aid being effective as well as to changes in the sample of recipient 
countries. As indicated before, the World Bank’s CPIA is publicly available only in 
rudimentary form for IDA eligible countries. By contrast, exact indicator values are accessible 
for the Kaufmann index on institutional conditions in essentially all recipient countries. The 
price to be paid for the more precise information from Kaufmann et al. (2003) is that the 
coverage of the CPIA, which includes macroeconomic and structural policy parameters, is 
much broader (IDA 2003). Yet, the recent literature on the primacy of institutions for 
economic development (e.g., Rodrik and Subramanian 2003) renders it plausible to consider   12
the Kaufmann index as an alternative measure to assess the developmental orientation of 
donors when allocating foreign aid. 
In Table 2, we present the results for those determinants of aid that are of major interest in 
evaluating the allocative behavior of bilateral and multilateral donors.10 The estimates are run 
for two different samples of recipient countries: (i) IDA eligible recipients as in Table 1, and 
(ii) the full sample of recipients for which the Kaufmann index and other required data are 
available.11 Hence, it can be identified whether results that diverge from those reported 
before are due to the measurement of local conditions or the inclusion of relatively advanced 
recipient countries. 
In some respects, the substitution of the CPIA for the Kaufmann index has little effect. This 
applies especially to the poverty orientation of aid. As before, almost all coefficients of the 
per-capita income variable are significantly negative.12 Furthermore, the view that 
multilateral aid is better targeted to poor recipients is rejected once again. Nor do we find 
evidence indicating an intensified poverty orientation since 1998. As concerns the export 
variable, Table 2 underscores the differences between bilateral and multilateral donors. This is 
even though the export variable remains insignificant for bilateral donors when running the 
Tobit model for the full sample and including the population of recipients as a control. If 
population is dropped from the specification, the export variable turns significantly positive at 
the 5 per cent level or better for the full sample, too.13  
The most striking result is that the policy orientation of both bilateral and multilateral donors 
is extremely weak when local conditions are measured by (the residuals of) the Kaufmann 
index. There are several possible reasons for the discrepancy between the two measures of 
local conditions. The CPIA may be applied as a guiding principle for allocating aid not only 
                                                 
10   The results for variables not reported in Table 2 are fairly similar to those shown in Table 1. 
Complete results are available upon request. 
11   We do not present estimates of IDA’s aid for the full sample, since more advanced developing 
countries do not get aid from this source by definition. 
12    The only exception is the insignificant coefficient in the estimate for multilateral aid to IDA 
eligible countries in 2002. 
13   By contrast, the export variable is, at best, weakly significant for multilateral donors if population 
is dropped in the estimate covering the full sample.   13
by IDA itself but also by other donors. As a matter of fact, the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) has used since recently an aid allocation model which 
relies on the CPIA (and per-capita income of recipients).14 Dollar and Levin (2004: 7) note 
that some donors explicitly follow allocation rules comprising the CPIA, which is, for 
example, true for the African Development Bank (McGillivray 2003). On the other hand, the 
classification of recipient countries into quintiles may have as a result that the policy 
orientation of aid is overstated when applying the CPIA measure. In contrast to what one 
might expect, the variance of the CPIA index values appears to be much smaller than the 
range from “one” to “five” for the quintiles suggest. According to IDA (2003), which reports 
the average index values for the quintiles in 2002, countries with a very poor rating were 
assigned an average CPIA of 2.57; countries with a very good rating had an average CPIA of 
3.69. Dollar and Levin (2004) state that the standard deviation of the CPIA across developing 
countries is just about 20 per cent. 
In any case, our results reveal that the policy orientation of foreign aid strongly depends on 
how local conditions are measured. Considering the widespread belief that institutions matter 
most for economic development, the extremely weak results we get for the Kaufmann index 
suggest that the allocation of aid leaves much to be desired in order to render foreign aid an 
effective means to stimulate the development of recipient countries. Compared to the 
measurement of local conditions, the composition of the sample has relatively little effect. 
The results for multilateral aid in Table 2 are not affected when running the estimate for the 
full sample instead of the sub-sample of IDA eligible countries. As concerns bilateral donors, 
the impact of the Kaufmann index on aid allocation across IDA eligible countries in 1998 
becomes insignificant for the full sample of recipient countries. 
2. Bilateral Aid of Major Donors 
The same set of estimates is performed for individual bilateral donors. To keep the 
presentation within reasonable limits, results reported in Tables 3 and 4 are restricted to the 
variables of particular interest in the present context. 
                                                 
14   This information was provided by John Burton from DFID, whom we would like to thank for 
comments and suggestions related to an earlier paper.   14
Similar to earlier studies, we find that the poverty focus differs across bilateral donors. The 
coefficient of the per-capita income variable is consistently negative at the 5 per cent level or 
better for the three Scandinavian countries, Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. Even within this group, there are significant differences. Especially in the estimates 
run for the sample of IDA eligible countries (Table 3 and first half of Table 4), the United 
Kingdom stands out in that the coefficient of the per-capita income variable is clearly highest. 
An increase in per-capita income by US$ 1000 would, on average, reduce UK aid by more 
than US$ 10 million, compared to a drop of about US$ 3.5 million in the Norwegian and 
Swedish case.15 However, we find hardly any evidence supporting the claim of donors that 
the poverty focus of aid has been strengthened over time. 
The poverty orientation of aid granted to IDA eligible recipients is weaker for the remaining 
three donors. This applies to Japan in particular.16 In the case of France, the per-capita 
income of recipients did not have a significant impact on the allocation of aid in several years. 
No consistent pattern emerges for the United States. 
The impact of per-capita income on aid allocation is essentially the same independently of 
whether the CPIA or the Kaufmann index is taken as a measure of local conditions. By 
contrast, the results are affected if the estimates are performed for the full sample of recipient 
countries instead of IDA eligible recipients only. The second half of Table 4 points to several 
notable changes. First of all, the coefficient of the per-capita income variable declines for all 
bilateral donors which were shown before to have a relatively strong poverty orientation. On 
the other hand, more favorable results are achieved for France and the United States. In 2002, 
the coefficient of per-capita income even turns out to be higher for the United States than for 
the United Kingdom. Hence, the differences in the poverty orientation across important 
bilateral donors are less pronounced when the sample is extended to include more advanced 
developing countries. 
The donor-specific estimates underscore what has been said before on the policy orientation 
of aid. Recipients with a better CPIA classification typically got more aid, whereas the 
                                                 
15   Relatively speaking, the impact is similar for aid granted by these three donors, as the overall aid 
budget of the United Kingdom is almost three times the aid budget of Norway and Sweden, 
respectively. 
16   Note that the two significant coefficients of the per-capita income variable reported in Table 3 for 
Japan turn insignificant when the Tobit model is estimated without the export variable.   15
allocative behavior of donors was rarely related with the Kaufmann index. Yet, bilateral 
donors behaved differently: 
•  Similar to Dollar and Levine (2004), Table 3 reveals that the group of poverty oriented 
donors was also relatively policy oriented. The coefficient of the CPIA is consistently 
positive for exactly the same donors (the Scandinavian countries, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). Moreover, the United Kingdom again stands 
out within this group in that changes in the CPIA have the biggest impact on aid 
allocation, with an improvement by one mark in the CPIA ranking raising UK aid by 
US$  6–11 million. As in the case of the per-capita income variable, the coefficients of 
the CPIA variable do not support the claim of an increasing policy orientation over 
time, except for the Netherlands and Sweden. 
•  The results for Japan and the United States are in conflict with Nunnenkamp et al. 
(2004), who found the share of aid granted to recipients with a favorable CPIA rating 
to be highest for these two donors. Once other aid determinants are controlled for, the 
CPIA classification plays a minor role in shaping the allocation of US aid. In the case 
of Japan, the coefficient of the CPIA appears to be high, but this result is far from 
robust.17 
•  If the CPIA is replaced by the Kaufmann index, the aid allocation of most donors is, at 
best, weakly shaped by local conditions. For several donors, still poorer results are 
achieved when estimating the model for the full sample, rather than IDA eligible 
recipients only. Denmark represents a major exception. All coefficients of the 
Kaufmann index are highly significant for this donor, independently of the sample 
considered.18 
                                                 
17   In addition to the insignificant coefficient for the year 2000, two of the remaining coefficients turn 
insignificant when the export variable is excluded from the specification of the model. 
18   The extension of the sample to more advanced developing countries has little effect as Denmark 
provides aid to a limited number of relatively poor countries. As a result, the number of left-
censored observations is exceptionally high, especially when the full sample is considered.   16
The post-conflict dummy typically remains insignificant, particularly in earlier years.19 Japan 
is an exception insofar as its allocation of aid was biased against post-conflict countries. On 
the other hand, some donors, namely France, Sweden and the United States, appear to have 
adjusted their aid allocation recently to take into account that post-conflict resolution may 
require increased aid efforts. The United States is leading in this respect. According to the 
estimates run for the full sample, US aid to countries under post-conflict conditions has been 
increased significantly since 1998, with the extra amount rising from US$ 12 to 27 million 
(not shown).20 Considering that it is only since recently that aid is supposed to be an effective 
means of post-conflict resolution (Isenman and Ehrenpreis 2003), this needs-oriented 
motivation of aid can be expected to gain in importance in the future. 
In contrast to the post-conflict dummy, the colonial dummy should have become less relevant 
if recipient need had increasingly shaped the allocation of aid. This is hardly the case, 
however. With just one exception (France in 2002), Table 3 shows that former colonies still 
received significantly more aid from France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In the 
restricted sample, disbursements to former colonies exceed the average amounts given to 
other recipients by more than US$ 20 million for France, by US$ 25-45 million for the United 
Kingdom, and by an extraordinary US$ 70–140 million for the Netherlands, which exhibit an 
extreme bias in favor of Indonesia. These quantities indicate that colonial ties still play a key, 
or perhaps even the dominant, role in former colonial powers’ aid allocation. Moreover, the 
extra amounts involved do not reveal a declining trend since the late 1990s. This also holds if 
the estimates are run for the full sample. In addition, the estimates for the full sample include 
a dummy set equal to “one” for US aid to Egypt and Israel, in order to reflect the strategic 
interest of the United States in these two countries (not shown). This strategic interest remains 
a dominant factor in the allocation of US aid. In 2002, Egypt and Israel accounted for 13 per 
cent of total US aid. 
Finally, trade interests continue to have an important impact on aid allocation by some 
bilateral donors. This applies especially to France and Japan. In the estimates for the full 
sample, French and Japanese aid was by US$  4–8 million higher in 2000 and 2002 for 
                                                 
19   The post-conflict dummy is listed only in Table 3, as the results for this variable are hardly affected 
by changes in the measurement of local conditions and the sample of recipient countries. The same 
applies to the colonial dummy. 
20   This is matched only by France in 2002.   17
recipients with twice as big a share in the total exports of these two donors. The coefficients 
of the export variable rise dramatically if the sample is restricted to IDA eligible recipients, 
but this is mainly because trade relations are less intense with these recipients, most of which 
are not only relatively poor but also relatively small. 
Though less pronounced than for France and Japan, trade-related interests have also shaped 
the aid allocation of other donors, including donors which are often regarded as altruistic. For 
example, it is in striking contrast to Berthélemy (2005) that Denmark granted more aid in 
recent years to countries absorbing a higher share of its exports. To some extent, the same is 
true for Norway and the United States (both for the restricted sample) as well as Germany 
(especially for the full sample). Results are not clear-cut for the United Kingdom: The export 
variable turns out to be insignificant if the estimates are based on the restricted sample of IDA 
eligible recipients. However, this result is sensitive to the specification of the Tobit model; the 
coefficient becomes significantly positive if population is dropped as a control. By contrast, 
the export variable remains insignificant for Dutch and Swedish aid, independently of how the 
model is specified and which sample is underlying the estimates. Hence, it is only for these 
two donors that it can safely be concluded that the allocation of aid was unaffected by selfish 
trade interests. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we performed a Tobit analysis of aid allocation that accounts for both altruistic 
and selfish motives on the part of donors. We first compared the allocative behavior of all 
bilateral donors taken together with that of multilateral aid agencies, and then looked at nine 
major bilateral donors individually. It turned out that poorer countries get clearly more aid 
from both bilateral and multilateral donors, with the possible exception of France and Japan. 
This is very much in line with what Dollar and Levin (2004) found in their recent study. In 
contrast to Dollar and Levin, however, our estimates do neither suggest that multilateral aid is 
better targeted to poor countries than to bilateral aid, nor that IDA performs particularly well 
within the group of multilateral donors.  
A more differentiated picture emerges when it comes to the policy orientation of foreign aid. 
Empirical findings strongly depend on how local conditions are measured.  If the World 
Bank’s CPIA is taken as an indicator of governance in recipient countries, the result is that 
both bilateral and multilateral donors directed significantly more aid to well governed   18
recipients. The group of poverty oriented bilateral donors also turns out to be relatively policy 
oriented. Again, our estimates do not support Dollar and Levin’s conclusion that multilateral 
donors perform better than bilateral donors, and that the policy orientation of aid provided by 
IDA is stronger than that of multilateral aid from other sources. If the CPIA is replaced by the 
Kaufmann index, the policy orientation of aid becomes extremely weak, with a few notable 
exceptions such as Denmark. 
Post-conflict resolution, the third altruistic motive considered here, emerges as a significant 
determinant of aid allocation only in 2002, driven by France, Sweden and the United States. 
Given that the prospect of higher aid effectiveness in post-conflict situations has only recently 
been recognized, this needs-oriented motivation of aid can be expected to gain in importance 
in the future.  
The importance of selfish aid motives clearly differs between bilateral and multilateral 
donors. Our results provide no indication that donor countries were able to push through their 
individual trade and political interests at the multilateral level. By contrast, the export-related 
self interest of DAC countries provided a fairly strong incentive to grant bilateral aid. This 
applies especially to France and Japan, but export interests have also shaped the aid allocation 
of donors often regarded as altruistic. It is only for the Netherlands and Sweden that export 
interests did not at all affect the allocation of aid. Furthermore, colonial ties still play a key 
role in the aid allocation of former colonial powers. 
Taken together, our findings lead to the conclusion that the allocation of aid still leaves much 
to be desired. In other words, the current focus in the political arena to provide more aid in 
order to help achieve the Millennium Development Goals tends to ignore that such a  move 
might have minor effects on poverty or income disparities unless major donors such as France 
and Japan become more poverty and policy oriented and put less weight on their self-interest 
in providing aid. 
As for future research priorities, the most promising next step would be to perform a more 
disaggregated analysis. This is equally true for the aid and the governance variable. Roodman 
(2004) argues, for instance, that the motives behind project and program aid might differ. 
While the former would tend to be given to less well-governed recipients under strict 
surveillance by donors, the latter would, at least in principle, be tilted in favor of well-
governed recipients and  involve less external control. With respect to governance, donors 
might be more inclined to base their decisions on specific issues such as corruption, the rule   19
of law, or democracy than on fairly complex summary measures. The potential value added of 
disaggregating aid flows and governance indicators is not confined to getting a better 
understanding of how aid is actually allocated. As a recent paper by Clemens et al. (2004) 
illustrates, a careful distinction between different aid categories might also shed new light on 
the issue of whether aid is effective in raising growth rates, which would in turn inform the 
discussion about optimal disbursements. In the same vein, disaggregating the conventional 
governance indicators might reveal that some of their components are more conducive to aid 
effectiveness than others. 
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Table 1 —  Tobit Model Results for Total Bilateral Aid and Multilateral Aid: IDA Eligible 
Recipients with CPIA Classificationa 

















          
1999 -1.51  116819  59.0 -20.3  -0.044  40.0  66  0.09 
 (-5.51)*** (10.33)***  (1.38)  (-0.47)  (-3.23)*** (2.81)***     
2000 -1.38  98697  45.4 -31.4  -0.052  44.5  66  0.06 
 (-4.47)*** (7.36)***  (0.99)  (-0.67)  (-3.55)*** (2.84)***     
2001 -0.56  68684  73.8 13.7 -0.053  61.1  66  0.06 
 (-2.04)**  (5.86)***  (1.56)  (0.27)  (-3.31)*** (3.75)***     
2002 0.19 38538  25.0 131.8  -0.060  75.5  65  0.04 




            
1999 0.51  371  19.7 -15.5  -0.041  40.9  66  0.06 
 (3.05)***  (0.05)  (0.75)  (-0.58)  (-4.72)*** (4.70)***     
2000 0.80 -5888 6.9 -7.6 -0.031  27.1  65  0.09 
 (5.47)***  (-0.93)  (0.31)  (-0.34)  (-4.55)*** (3.66)***     
2001 0.64 -1048 1.5 -37.9  -0.051  38.4  65  0.06 
 (3.44)***  (-0.13)  (0.04)  (-1.14)  (-4.34)*** (3.35)***     
2002 0.64 -7070  20.6 10.2 -0.041  39.2  65  0.03 
 (2.64)**  (-0.68)  (0.47)  (0.22)  (-2.95)*** (2.62)**     
IDA              
1999 0.40 -1456  10.2 -22.9  -0.022  22.4  57  0.09 
 (4.15)***  (-0.35)  (0.71)  (-1.61)  (-4.32)*** (4.61)***     
2000 0.65 -6691 6.6 -12.8  -0.020  17.4  60  0.14 
 (8.41)***  (-2.01)**  (0.57)  (-1.10)  (-4.88)*** (4.33)***     
2001 0.45 -2510  -0.8 -32.9  -0.027  25.9  60  0.07 
 (4.29)***  (-0.55)  (-0.04)  (-1.76)*  (-3.93)*** (3.86)***     
2002 0.40 -4789 5.6 -6.0 -0.019  26.0  61  0.03 
 (2.86)***  (-0.80)  (0.22)  (-0.22)  (-2.35)**  (2.37)**     
at-values in parentheses; ***, **, * significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively; 
constant term included , but not reported. 
Source: Own calculations based on DAC online data.   23
Table 2 — Tobit Model Results for Total Bilateral Aid and Multilateral Aid: IDA Eligible 
Recipients and Full Sample with Kaufmann Indexa 













           
1998 31727  -0.0596  0.0490  624.4  3753.0  -0.0136 0.0220 
 (6.02)***  (-  3.95)***  (2.69)***  (0.59)  (3.45)***  (-2.64)*** (1.53) 
2000 102314  -0.0496  0.0265  -333.4  2096.1  -0.0102 0.0108 
 (7.31)***  (-2.94)***  (1.16)  (-0.31)  (2.12)**  (-2.12)** (0.74) 
2002 46681  -0.0563  0.0529  59.2 2384.1  -0.0109 0.0019 




           
1998 -3123.9  -0.0349  0.0204  -851.7  1011.3  -0.0101 0.0103 
 (-0.84)  (-3.29)***  (1.59)  (-1.73)*  (1.91)*  (-4.31)*** (1.57) 
2000 -2394.5  -0.0319  0.0171  -736.5  753.0  -0.0076 0.0063 
 (-0.36)  (-4.01)***  (1.58)  (-1.94)*  (1.82)*  (-4.10)*** (1.12) 
2002 -3360.3  -0.0267  -0.0120  -689.0  459.6  -0.0086 -0.0060 
 (-0.31)  (-1.48)  (-0.42)  (-1.04)  (0.76)  (-1.95)* (-0.39) 
IDA               
1998 -3979.4  -0.0148  0.0070        
 (-1.83)*  (-2.90)***  (1.14)  —   — — 
2000 -4357.5  -0.0205  0.0136        
 (-1.23)  (-4.39)***  (2.27)**  —   — — 
2002 -2813.7  -0.0114  -0.0078        
 (-0.45)  (-1.11)  (-0.47)  —   — — 
at-values in parentheses; ***, **, * significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively; see 
text for complete specification of the Tobit model. — bIn italics: results from alternative specification without 
population as an independent variable. 
Source: Own calculations based on DAC online data.   24
















Denmark          
1999 1690.9  —  -1.78  -0.0061  4.28  44  0.08 
 (2.42)**    (-0.58)  (-4.09)***  (3.84)***     
2000 2713.3  —  -0.95  -0.0050  3.75  42  0.08 
 (2.81)***    (-0.33)  (-3.92)***  (3.65)***     
2001 1802.1  —  -0.94  -0.0061  4.06  43  0.07 
 (2.09)**    (-0.30)  (-4.10)***  (3.76)***     
2002 736.7  —  0.21  -0.0051  4.84  47  0.07 
 (1.24)    (0.07)  (-4.16)***  (4.58)***     
France          
1999 8832.7 20.77  -2.96  -0.0022  2.87  60  0.16 
 (10.48)***  (3.81)***  (-0.61)  (-1.28)  (1.72)*     
2000 6598.4 23.17  -2.94  -0.0028  3.84  60  0.18 
 (9.52)***  (5.39)***  (-0.76)  (-2.09)**  (2.80)***     
2001 4767.4 20.72  -0.45  -0.0025  2.56  58  0.20 
 (10.05)***  (7.15)***  (-0.16)  (-2.44)**  (2.64)***     
2002 10559.0  6.03  37.98  -0.0041  6.69  59  0.05 
  (4.26)*** (0.43)  (2.88)*** (-0.95)  (1.51)     
Germany          
1999 -486.6  —  -5.37  -0.0077  6.12  63  0.06 
 (-0.49)    (-1.22)  (-5.16)***  (4.26)***     
2000 -252.7  —  -2.74  -0.0054  3.60  64  0.03 
 (-0.21)    (-0.68)  (-4.10)***  (2.67)***     
2001 655.4  —  0.64  -0.0046  4.27  63  0.06 
 (0.66)    (0.20)  (-4.19)***  (3.94)***     
2002 4176.3  —  7.58  -0.0060  6.11  61  0.04 
 (2.95)***    (1.35)  (-3.28)***  (3.28)***     
Japan              
1999 57513  —  -18.79 -0.0075  7.11  66  0.26 
 (40.52)***    (-1.74)*  (-2.11)**  (2.03)**     
2000 33661  —  -36.74 -0.0084  5.52  64  0.12 
 (13.67)***    (-1.86)*  (-1.37)  (0.84)    
2001 20793.0  —  -19.57 -0.0072  10.67  64  0.17 
 (16.34)***    (-1.48)  (-1.69)*  (2.45)**     
2002 11698  —  -14.90 -0.0039  9.19  63  0.14 
 (10.15)***    (-1.21)  (-1.03)  (2.27)**     
Netherlands          
1999 103.2  70.72  -0.44  -0.0054  4.16  49  0.11 
 (0.29)  (8.34)***  (-0.18)  (-4.69)***  (4.74)***     
2000 140.3  136.35 -1.31  -0.0059  4.98  54  0.11 
 (0.25)  (10.26)***  (-0.35)  (-4.60)***  (4.07)***     
2001 498.0  91.84  -2.78  -0.0058  5.21  64  0.07 
 (0.67)  (5.04)***  (-0.59)  (-3.54)***  (3.28)***     
2002 -324.3 94.22  8.43  -0.0080  6.89  61  0.07 
 (-0.53)  (4.82)***  (1.50)  (-4.18)***  (3.66)***     
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Norway          
1999 1056.2  —  0.69  -0.0037  2.50  52  0.08 
 (3.14)***    (0.40)  (-4.41)***  (4.00)***     
2000 870.5  —  0.74  -0.0026  1.52  54  0.06 
 (1.65)*    (0.50)  (-4.02)***  (2.89)***     
2001 411.4  —  1.07  -0.0031  2.19  54  0.07 
 (2.05)**    (0.71)  (-4.51)***  (4.02)***     
2002 809.2  —  2.48  -0.0040  3.20  50  0.09 
 (2.47)**    (1.43)  (-4.99)***  (4.85)***     
Sweden              
1999 488.1  —  2.37  -0.0032  2.11  51  0.05 
 (1.19)    (1.15)  (-3.47)***  (2.89)***     
2000 717.8  —  1.32  -0.0038  2.76  54  0.05 
 (0.91)    (0.57)  (-3.81)***  (3.34)***     
2001 315.6  —  1.10  -0.0032  2.71  50  0.05 
 (0.59)    (0.51)  (-3.62)***  (3.62)***     
2002 -141.4  —  4.30  -0.0040  3.57  52  0.08 
 (-0.48)    (2.08)**  (-4.53)***  (4.93)***     
United 
Kingdom 
        
1999 297.2  24.20  1.76  -0.0088  5.61  58  0.11 
  (0.29) (5.14)***  (0.37) (-5.31)***  (3.62)***     
2000 -1324.4  40.74  10.57  -0.0138  10.12  58  0.11 
 (-0.98)  (6.19)***  (1.59)  (-6.08)***  (4.44)***     
2001 -1677.7  32.49  13.22  -0.0150  11.02  56  0.07 
 (-0.97)  (4.14)***  (1.62)  (-5.05)***  (3.95)***     
2002  18.9 25.38  5.33 -0.0092  6.94  56  0.18 
  (0.02) (4.89)***  (0.99) (-4.96)***  (3.77)***     
United  States          
1999 9793.2  —  6.37  -0.0059  3.72  63  0.04 
 (4.51)***    (0.95)  (-2.56)***  (1.69)*     
2000 13313  —  12.14  -0.0068  5.70  65  0.06 
 (5.55)***    (1.72)*  (-3.07)***  (2.39)**     
2001 14163  —  -2.22  -0.0080  6.43  63  0.01 
 (2.12)**    (-0.12)  (-1.28)  (1.02)    
2002 12256  —  22.78  -0.0101  8.18  61  0.04 
 (3.52)***    (2.17)**  (-2.95)***  (2.34)**     
             
at-values in parentheses; ***, **, * significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively; 
constant term and population included, but not reported. 
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Table 4 — Tobit Model Results for Selected Bilateral Donors: IDA Eligible Recipients 
and Full Sample with Kaufmann Indexa 
Donors  IDA sample  Full sample 




Donor exports Per-capita 
income 
Kaufmann index
Denmark        
1998  591.7  -0.0067 0.0041  139.8  -0.0020 0.0025 
  (1.56)  (-4.02)*** (2.86)***  (2.02)**  (-5.22)*** (3.46)*** 
2000  3272.8  -0.0051 0.0039  141.5  -0.0019 0.0021 
  (3.09)***  (-3.55)*** (2.53)**  (1.93)*  (-5.09)*** (3.18)*** 
2002  1407.7  -0.0060 0.0061  210.5  -0.0021 0.0030 
  (2.16)**  (-3.76)*** (2.69)***  (2.42)**  (-4.98)*** (3.00)*** 
France        
1998 4558.0 -0.0035  0.0025 1320.6 -0.0023  0.0015 
 (6.12)***  (-1.83)*  (1.12)  (6.18)***  (-3.13)***  (0.76) 
2000  6988.4  -0.0031 0.0040  877.9  -0.0016 0.0020 
 (10.10)***  (-2.10)**  (2.08)**  (5.15)***  (-2.96)***  (1.19) 
2002  10937.5 -0.0052 0.0097  869.1  -0.0014 0.0021 
  (4.31)***  (-0.97) (1.16)  (2.49)**  (-1.09) (0.46) 
Germany          
1998  4957.1  -0.0123 0.0092  297.8  -0.0023 0.0031 
  (7.75)***  (-4.91)*** (3.52)***  (1.97)**  (-3.66)*** (1.72)* 
2000  51.2  -0.0059 0.0041  338.8  -0.0018 0.0013 
  (0.04)  (-4.10)*** (2.15)**  (3.19)***  (-4.57)*** (1.11) 
2002  4508.9  -0.0063 0.0056  312.2  -0.0020 0.0016 
  (3.05)***  (-2.67)*** (1.53)  (2.39)**  (-3.38)*** (0.80) 
Japan       
1998 11446  -0.0061  0.0037 1482.6 -0.0052  0.0035 
 (10.44)***  (-1.05)  (0.52)  (4.72)***  (-2.71)***  (0.63) 
2000 33846  -0.0079  0.0021 1080.7 -0.0041  0.0006 
 (13.45)***  (-1.15)  (0.23)  (2.40)**  (-1.78)*  (0.08) 
2002  11960  -0.0004 -0.0019 660.4  -0.0028 0.0013 
 (10.04)***  (-0.09)  (-0.25)  (2.78)***  (-1.77)*  (0.21) 
Netherlands        
1998  1013.8  -0.0050 0.0047  147.8  -0.0019 0.0025 
  (1.47)  (-3.68)*** (2.95)***  (1.70)*  (-5.55)*** (3.06)*** 
2000  251.6  -0.0056 0.0031  134.3  -0.0019 0.0019 
  (0.41)  (-3.73)*** (1.68)*  (1.55)  (-4.80)*** (2.26)** 
2002  -498.1  -0.0065 0.0016  28.6  -0.0010 -0.0002 
  (-0.75)  (-2.61)***  (0.42) (0.20) (-1.85)*  (-0.10) 
Norway        
1998  1798.9  -0.0040 0.0018  20.6  -0.0011 0.0012 
  (2.91)***  (-4.02)*** (2.11)**  (0.45)  (-4.80)*** (2.71)*** 
2000  1094.9  -0.0024 0.0008  -11.0  -0.0004 0.0002 
  (1.97)**  (-3.39)*** (1.05)  (-0.42)  (-3.60)*** (0.53) 
2002  569.4  -0.0037 0.0019  10.7  -0.0008 0.0004 
  (1.47) (-3.60)***  (1.35) (0.27) (-3.40)***  (0.65) 
Sweden        
1998  102.9  -0.0031 0.0013  48.2  -0.0009 0.0010 
  (0.51) (-2.93)***  (1.28) (1.12) (-4.08)***  (1.99)** 
2000  933.5  -0.0034 0.0013  15.5  -0.0008 0.0008 
  (1.10) (-3.03)***  (1.09) (0.40) (-3.74)***  (1.33) 
2002  56.0  -0.0040 0.0026  32.1  -0.0008 0.0008 
  (0.17)  (-3.48)*** (1.75)*  (0.65)  (-3.40)*** (1.07) 
United 
Kingdom 
      
1998  676.4  -0.0090 0.0036  200.5  -0.0019 0.0028 
  (0.69)  (-4.48)*** (1.58)  (1.98)**  (-3.93)*** (2.26)** 
2000  -1469.7 -0.0121 0.0034  292.9  -0.0028 0.0034 
  (-0.99)  (-4.53)***  (0.99) (1.62) (-3.94)***  (1.90)* 
2002  -615.9  -0.0090 0.0033  345.2  -0.0028 0.0032 
  (-0.65)  (-3.79)*** (0.92)  (1.70)*  (-3.25)*** (1.25) 
United  States        
1998  2025.4  -0.0046 0.0036  -2.4  -0.0019 0.0021 
 (1.96)**  (-2.76)***  (1.85)*  (-0.03)  (-2.30)**  (0.96) 
2000  14045.7 -0.0061 0.0020  49.8  -0.0026 0.0006 
  (5.71)***  (-2.39)**  (0.59) (0.51) (-2.81)***  (0.23) 
2002  13271.2 -0.0071 -0.0029 194.9  -0.0038 -0.0040 
 (3.68)***  (-1.66)*  (-0.43)  (1.48)  (-2.25)**  (-0.71) 
at-values in parentheses; ***, **, * significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively; see text 
for complete specification of the Tobit model. 
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Appendix: Data and Sources 
Variable Description  Source 
Aid  Net disbursements of official 
development assistance, 






Colonial dummy  Set equal to “one” for former 
colonies of Belgium, France, 
the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom 
Information provided by Jean-Claude 
Berthélemy 
CPIA  Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment; 
classification of IDA eligible 
countries into quintiles, with 
“one” assigned to countries 
with least favorable policies 
and “five” assigned to those 
with most favorable policies. 







Donor exports  Share of exports of donor 
country j to recipient country i 
in total exports of donor 
country j; per cent; lagged one 
year. 
IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 
Yearbook, various issues 
Kaufmann index  Estimated residuals from 
regressing GDP per capita on 
the summary index of 
institutional conditions in 
recipient countries. 
Own calculations based on Kaufmann et al. 
(2003) 
Per-capita income  GDP per capita of recipient 
countries in purchasing power 
parities; current international 
US$ 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators, CD-ROM 
Population  Population of recipient 
countries; million 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators, CD-ROM 
Post-conflict dummy  Set equal to “one” for 
recipient countries which 
received grants from the 
World Bank’s Post Conflict 
Fund 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/essd/sdv/ 
pcf.nsf/EHome?OpenView 
 
 